China is likely to restrict supply of low-carbon technology and components, even outside of a conflict scenario. A recurring theme in our research interviews was that China now dominates large parts of the low‑carbon technology supply chain and is increasingly willing to use this position as leverage. There are several examples of China limiting exports in response to diplomatic disputes or domestic priorities: critical minerals to Japan in 2010; gallium, germanium, graphite, and antimony to several countries in 2023-4; heavy rare earths and magnets to the US in 2025; and critical minerals to Japan again in 2026.

Beyond deliberate restrictions, the geographic concentration of supplies in China means that interruptions could also occur because of extreme weather events, logistical disruptions, or even pandemics, as seen during COVID-19.

Such disruptions would raise costs, delay new projects, and hamper operations of existing projects in the medium term should replacement parts not be available. The impact would vary by component: losing access to permanent magnets would be more disruptive than losing access to solar panels. However, the overall impact on currently operating systems would be low, and there would be time for mitigations to be developed. Losing access to Chinese solar panels would be less damaging than suddenly losing access to oil and gas supplies, by comparison. Alternative supplies might also be available, albeit at a higher price.